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Abstract 
Sunday and Gauthier (2018) raise a number of interesting points about Young and Burton's (2018) revisionist 
opinion of expertise for recognizing face identity. We are happy to clarify and debate these matters by explaining 
further why we proposed independent criteria for expertise, how we see the roles of perceptual experience and the 
everyday demands of face recognition, why we agree that individual differences are important, why we don't 
accept the idea of a linear hierarchy of perceptual recognition difficulty from unfamiliar to familiar faces, and the 
relevance of things we can indeed see in unfamiliar faces. 
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Response 
As heretics from the prevailing orthodoxy, we 
realized that our rethink of expertise for 
recognizing face identity (Young & Burton, 
2018a - henceforth Y&B) would ruffle a few 
feathers. Sunday and Gauthier's (2018) 
commentary (S&G) defends and brings up to 
date a perspective that has been developed 
across more than 30 years, since the study by 
Diamond and Carey (1986). Although Y&B 
pointed out that this perspective has never been 
accepted by everyone (see, for example 
Kanwisher, 2000), it has nonetheless been 
widely used. 
To put the debate in context, Y&B pointed 
out that the view defended by S&G is one that 
considers humans to have acquired expertise at 
perceiving and recognizing the unique identities  
of both unfamiliar and familiar faces, whereas 




is largely restricted to recognition of familiar 
faces. Importantly, Y&B didn't claim that 
humans are completely unable to recognize the 
identities of unfamiliar faces, only that identity 
tasks with unfamiliar faces are difficult, and our 
comparatively poor performance makes the 
³H[SHUW´ODEHOXQZDUUDQWHG1HLWKHUGLG<	%
deny that we can see lots of things other than 
identity in unfamiliar faces; for example, we 
might be considered relatively expert for 
judging the sex, age, or expression of all faces. 
The core of the debate, then, concerns expertise 
for face identity (see also Rossion, 2018; Young 
& Burton, 2018b). 
There are some points of substantial 
agreement; S&G accept the importance of 
understanding how familiar and unfamiliar face 
recognition may differ, and they accept that 
³IDPLOLDULW\LVDFTXLUHGRQHIDFHDWDWLPHDVZH
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learn idiosyncratic information about each 
SHUVRQ´7KHVHZHUHFRUQHUVWRQHVRI<	%¶V
discussion (see also Young & Burton, 2017; 
Young, 2018). 
Having said that, we do still disagree with 
S&G over the interpretation of a number of 
other points they raise. Over the years, we have 
reached the conclusion that the idea of 
generalized visual face identity expertise that 
can encompass recognition of unfamiliar face 
identities is in some ways misleading. Some of 
the issues raised by S&G are ones we were not 
able to discuss at length in the original 
(necessarily short) Y&B opinion piece. We 
welcome the opportunity to clarify our views on 
these.  
One focus of disagreement involves how to 
define and measure expertise. In drafting Y&B, 
we were surprised to discover that we mainly 
found operational definitions in the literature on 
face expertise. For example, claims that 
expertise can be measured through holistic 
processing or inversion effects are in effect 
operational definitions that assume (rightly or 
wrongly) that these will be consequences of 
H[SHUWSHUIRUPDQFH:HGRQ¶WFODLPWKDWWKHVH
operational definitions are implausible, but they 
do run a risk of circularity; for example, through 
claiming that face recognition is expert because 
there are substantial inversion effects and that 
inversion effects reflect expertise because they 
are found for faces. 
To avoid this circularity, Y&B decided to 
seek independent criteria for expertise. We drew 
on widely-used theories concerning perceptual 
learning and skill acquisition (e.g. Logan, 1988; 
Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977) to suggest that 
expert performance should be based on 
substantial experience, should result in accurate 
performance, and should become relatively 
automatic. We then evaluated studies of face 
recognition against these criteria. We accept 
6	*¶VUHPDUNWKDWWKLVZDV<	%¶V³RZQ
GHILQLWLRQRIH[SHUWLVH´DQGZHDJUHHZLWKWKHLU
view that expertise is not simply an all or none 
phenomenon. We think, however, that offering a 
set of independent criteria is a step forward. 
In previous work, Gauthier et al. (2000, 
p.191) had suggested two key characteristics for 
IDFHH[SHUWLVH³)LUVWIDFHVDUHUHFRJQL]HGDWD
more specific level of categorization (for 
H[DPSOHµ$GDP¶WKDQPRVWREMHFWVIRU
H[DPSOHµFKDLU¶RUµFDU¶6HFRQGDOWKRXJKZH
are experts with faces, we have much less 
experience discriminating among members of 
RWKHUFDWHJRULHV´7KHVHVXJJHVWLRQVDUHZRUWK
considering carefully. The first characteristic 
(level of categorization) is in some respects 
FRQVLVWHQWZLWK<	%¶VHPSKDVLVRQWKH
importance of familiarity. However, we doubt 
that the entry level category for an unfamiliar 
face is its unique individual idenWLW\³$GDP´
though we do agree that it is certainly likely to 





of expertise (the role of experience of 
discriminating between face identities) that we 
differ from S&G. We will explain why. 
Using the criteria for expertise we proposed, 
<	%SREVHUYHGWKDW³6XEVWDQWLDO 
lifelong perceptual experience is therefore 
undoubtedly important to face recognition, and 
in this sense the first of our criteria for face 
H[SHUWLVHGRHVVHHPWREHDSSOLFDEOH´(YLGHQFH
cited by Y&B (p.101) included perceptual 
narrowing in infants and other-race effects in 
adulthood; to that extent, we agreed with S&G. 
However, Y&B then went on to note that their 
other criteria for expertise (accurate and 
automatic performance) are not met for 
unfamiliar face recognition and concluded 
<	%SWKDW³While there is undoubtedly 
a sense in which our huge experience of looking 
at the faces around us has created a type of 
expertise, this does not take the form of the 
generic ability to recognize any face identity 
WKDWKDVEHHQVRZLGHO\DVVXPHG´DQGWKDW
³Although clearly shaped by experience in some 
ways, as shown for example by other-race 
effects, unfamiliar face recognition remains 
generally vulnerable to the impact of the 
enormous variability in everyday images of 
IDFHV´ 
Some of the points raised by S&G reiterate 
*DXWKLHUHWDO¶VHPSKDVLVRQWKHLPSDFW
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of experience, which (as noted above) Y&B 
never sought to deny; indeed, our own studies 
have also shown the critical importance to 
learning new faces of presenting stimuli in 
typically experienced formats (Kramer, Jenkins, 
Young & Burton, 2017). Our claim is rather that 
while experience undoubtedly plays an 
important role in shaping our face perception 
abilities, it does not shape them specifically 
toward recognizing unfamiliar face identity.  
There is also an important difference 
between experience in the sense of mere 
exposure to a class of visual stimuli and the type 
RIH[SHULHQFHWKDWFUHDWHVH[SHUWLVH6	*¶VWDNH
on this is that the essential component 
underlying expertise is the functional need to 
discriminate between and individuate members 
of a visual category, which they assume happens 
often for unfamiliar faces in everyday life. We 
are not so convinced that precise individuation 
of unfamiliar faces is actually such an over-
riding everyday demand; there are many 
circumstances in which full individuation of an 
unfamiliar face is not needed. We suspect that 
many readers will, for example, have had the 
experience of assuming that any young man 
who comes to their table in a restaurant is the 
waiter and then failing to notice if a different 
waiter subsequently arrives.  
Such anecdotes are strikingly borne out by 
demonstrations of change blindness with 
unfamiliar faces (Simons & Levin, 1998). In 
contrast, if everyday individuation of all seen 
faces was in itself sufficient to create generic 
expertise for face identity, Y&B pointed out that 
performance at tasks such as unfamiliar face 
matching would be less variable than has proved 
to be the case, eye witness reports would be less 
fallible, and passport officers would make fewer 
mistakes. Indeed, if individual identity is the 
dominant level of categorization of all faces, 
phenomena such as change blindness for 
unfamiliar faces (Simons & Levin, 1998) could 
not occur. Our opinion is instead that it is 
individuation of familiar faces that is the critical 
everyday ability, since it allows us to go beyond 
LPPHGLDWHFRQWH[WXDOFDWHJRULHVVXFKDV³WKH
ZDLWHU´DQGUHWULHYHWKHUHOHYDQWLGHQWLW\-
specific information that allows us to interact 
appropriately with people we know in light of 
our past experience with them (Bruce & Young, 
1986; Kramer, Young et al., 2017; Young, 
2018). 
This brings us to the issue of variability 
across individuals. Until the late 1990s, most 
researchers (including us) tended to assume that 
nearly all neurologically normal perceivers 
would perform at a fairly uniform overall level 
on face perception tasks, and in consequence 
little attention was paid to individual 
differences. However, it has turned out that the 
performance of tests of unfamiliar face 
matching and recognition by neurologically 
normal individuals can be remarkably variable; 
ranging from chance-level to near-perfect 
(Burton, White, & McNeill, 2010). These 
individual differences form an important 
phenomenon. Y&B used them to emphasise that 
XQIDPLOLDUIDFHUHFRJQLWLRQLVQ¶WFRQVLVWHQWO\
expert-like because the criterion of accurate 
SHUIRUPDQFHLVQ¶WPHWE\PRVWSHRSOHEXWZH
fully agree with S&G that the reasons for these 
individual differences in performance are 
interesting and that studying them is a useful 
enterprise. We certainly weren't seeking to 
³GLVFRXUDJHLQWHUHVWLQJUHVHDUFKDYHQXHV´ 
However, we suspect that when we have a 
better understanding of individual differences, 
their causes will turn out to be different from 
those emphasised by S&G. Part of the reason 
FDQEHVHHQLQ6	*¶V)LJXUHZKLFKVKRZVD
purported hierarchical continuum of difficulty 
of object recognition judgements that is claimed 
to run from easiest (S&G level 1 - basic 
category level recognition) to hardest (S&G 
level 4 - subordinate level recognition of 
familiar exemplars). Figures like this occur in 
many textbooks and exemplify one version of a 
traditional view of recognition. Although they 
can exert a powerful intuitive appeal, we think 
they are incorrect. Instead the relatively high 
error rates in unfamiliar as compared to familiar 
IDFHUHFRJQLWLRQVKRZWKDWLIDQ\WKLQJ6	*¶V
level 4 recognition is not the most difficult; 
often it is easier to achieve than S&G level 3 
(subordinate level recognition of unfamiliar 
exemplars).  
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These observations follow naturally from 
<	%¶VSRLQWVHHDOVR%XUWRQ%XUWRQ
Kramer, Ritchie, & Jenkins, 2016; Young & 
Burton, 2017) that the variability of different 
HYHU\GD\LPDJHVRIWKHVDPHSHUVRQ¶VIDFHLVWR
some extent identity-specific; for example, the 
underlying dimensions across which images of 
the face of (say) Tom Cruise vary will be 
different from the dimensions of variability for 
the face of Hugh Jackman (Burton et al., 2016). 
Recent computational studies of face familiarity 
(Kramer, Young, Day, & Burton, 2017; Kramer, 
Young, & Burton, 2018) have shown how it is 
possible to create a model that can cope with 
everyday image variability to accurately identify 
images of a trained set of familiar faces (level 4 
UHFRJQLWLRQLQ6	*¶VWHUPV<HWWKHVDPH
model doesn't perform nearly as well with 
images of unfamiliar (i.e. untrained) faces (S&G 
level 3); it shows only limited ability to 
generalize beyond the trained set of identities. It 
is the existence of identity-specific variability 
that makes S&G level 3 intrinsically difficult, 
because the nature of the variability between 
images of an unfamiliar face is unknown when 
it is encountered for the first time. 
$WDGHHSHUWKHRUHWLFDOOHYHO<	%¶V
perspective emphasizes recognition of familiar 
faces as a primary social task that is essential to 
appropriate interactions based on previously 
stored identity-specific knowledge of an 
individual (cf. Bruce & Young, 1986; Kramer, 
Young et al., 2017; Young, 2018). For 
unfamiliar faces, there is no stored identity-
specific knowledge and context alone will often 
supply much of the information we need; the 
person who comes to your table in a restaurant 
is probably the waiter, the person behind the 
hotel front desk will be the receptionist, and so 
RQ,Q%UXFHDQG<RXQJ¶VWHUPV
everything else we can tell from an unfamiliar 
face must involve visually-derived semantic 
information. This is not to deny characteristics 
that may be more or less closely related to 
identity can be seen in unfamiliar faces and that 
visually-derived information can be very rich, 
encompassing the perception of age, gender, 
ethnicity, expression, gaze direction and a 
variety of social attributions (Bruce & Young, 
1986, 2012; Todorov, 2017; Young, 2018). It is 
of course important to understand how we learn 
to do these things with unfamiliar faces, but we 
consider that these abilities do not necessarily 
involve expertise for analyzing unfamiliar face 
identity per se. 
This is a significant point of difference from 
6	*¶VSRVLWLRQVLQFHWKHLUFODLPLVWKDWIDFH
expertise derives from constantly seeking to 
individuate unfamiliar faces in everyday life. 
Instead, Y&B noted that computational studies 
show that at least some visually-derived 
semantic information (gender and race) can be a 
consequence of learning to recognize a 
relatively small number of familiar face 
identities without any additional form of 
training involving unfamiliar faces (Kramer, 
Young et al., 2017). Moreover, our simulations 
show that training a model to be able to 
recognize everyday images of familiar faces can 
also lead to a modest but measurable benefit on 
recognizing the identities of unfamiliar faces, 
again without any training for unfamiliar face 
identity itself (Kramer et al., 2018).  
This small benefit to recognizing unfamiliar 
face identity accrues as an indirect consequence 
of the fact that local regions of a purely 
perceptual space must be reshaped in order to 
cope with identity-specific variability; in effect 
bringing different images of Tom Cruise closer 
together than they would be based on their 
purely visual attributes (see Kramer et al., 
2018). It seems that some of this reshaping can 
benefit the encoding of unfamiliar face identity, 
but we reiterate that this happens to only a 
limited extent. The observation is consistent 
with one of the main points emphasised by 
S&G²that most of us are able to recognise 
unfamiliar face identity to some degree²but in 
.UDPHUHWDO¶VVWXG\LWZDVVLPSO\DE\-
product of creating expertise in recognizing a 
specific set of familiar faces in a system that 
received no training whatsoever for recognizing 
the identities of unfamiliar faces. 
$QLVVXHWKDW<	%GLGQ¶WDGGUHVVFRQFHUQV
whether face perception has domain-specific 
properties (cf. Kanwisher, 2000; Rossion, 2018) 
or is simply the same in nature as any other 
form of visual expertise (Gauthier et al., 2000). 
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This issue has in the past generated much 
discussion because it relates to the wider 
question of the extent to which apparent brain 
specializations for face perception might instead 
be consequences of expertise (Gauthier et al., 
2000; Kanwisher, 2000). Y&B set aside the 
issue because we think that it cannot at present 
be resolved without a better understanding of 
the sense(s) in which it may be appropriate to 
say that we are face experts. However, we note 
WKDWVXEVWDQWLDOSDUWVRI6	*¶VFRPPHQWDU\DUH
predicated on the assumption that face expertise 
is no different from any other form of visual 
expertise. We do not have a firm view on this 
matter but, given our emphasis on the variety of 
social signals derived from faces, it seems to us 
likely that at least some aspects of face 
perception will prove to be domain-specific, 
whether or not they qualify as expert.  
Understanding human face recognition 
ability is of substantial theoretical and practical 
importance, so it is essential to discuss and 
debate these issues. In RXURSLQLRQ6	*¶V
commentary offers a fair, clearly-expressed, and 
courteous restatement of what has been a 
mainstream view of face expertise that sets a 
useful tone for this debate. We have tried to 
respond in kind, aiming to set out points of 
disagreement clearly and dispassionately, so that 
readers can form their own balanced opinion. 
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